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"Vito: I swore that I would never break the peace.
Michael: But won’t they take that as a sign of weakness?
Vito: It is a sign of weakness.”
The Godfather (1972).
1 Introduction
Conflict and bargaining are inextricably linked. In many situations, a failure in
striking an agreement precipitates a confrontation between the parties involved.
States engage in wars over territories, legal disputes end up in trial, unions
engage in strikes, firms fight price wars against their competitors, couples argue
on the distribution of chores. All these conflicts entail large losses in money,
time, output and equipment. But then, why is conflict so pervasive? Why are
agents unable to realize the existence of mutually beneficial agreements?
This paradox puzzled economist John Hicks, who attributed costly delays in
labour negotiations to mistakes and irrational behavior (Hicks, 1932). Roughly
at the same time, in the midst of the social turmoil of the Great Depression, so-
ciologist E. T. Hiller argued that strikes occurred because parties could only es-
timate they comparative strength by actually engaging in conflict (Hiller, 1933).
With that, Hiller was advancing the explanation to the Hicks paradox that we
will be examining in detail in this chapter: Incomplete information. Given that
strengths and power can be diﬃcult to observe and measure, it is likely that
parties hold private information over them. Moreover, parties have clear in-
centives to misrepresent their strength in order to obtain an advantage in the
bargaining table. In that case, even if a mutually beneficial agreement actually
exists, disagreement is to be expected, and thus conflict.1
The purpose of this chapter is also to challenge some of the commonly ac-
cepted ideas on conflict and bargaining within Economics. Economists’ views
on this issue are still profoundly influenced by Nash’s (1950) conception of the
bargaining problem, where conflict is reduced to a disagreement payoﬀ that par-
ties are supposed to receive when agreement fails and bargaining shuts down
completely. That approach can be useful in many contexts, like bilateral trade;
in that case, when buyer and seller disagree on the price for the good, they can
walk away and look for alternative trading partners. But in many other situ-
ations, like the examples mentioned above, it is wrong to think of conflict and
peace as two distinct phenomena. As Schelling (1960) put it in his seminal study
on conflict, "most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations."
The diﬀerences in the conducts of real conflicts falsify the conception of
peaceful diplomacy and conflict as mutually exclusive alternatives. Many dis-
putes do not entail any hostilities, like for instance the Second Moroccan Crisis
in 1911 or 80-90% of contract negotiations (Kennan and Wilson, 1989). In many
other occasions, hostilities precede agreement. As a matter of fact, about 65%
of interstate wars end with a negotiated settlement (Leventoglu and Slantchev,
1Commitment problems constitute another powerful explanation for conflict. See Fearon
(1995) for an illuminating discussion on this issue.
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2007). Only a few disputes become absolute conflicts in which parties engage in
a fight to the finish. Models of bargaining should be able to account for all these
diﬀerent patterns by incorporating conflict as part of the negotiation process.
In this chapter, we will provide an overview and a critical account of the
literature on bargaining and conflict under incomplete information. We will first
revise the basic economic approach to the topic that takes confrontation as final.
That implies that conflict and ineﬃciencies are to be expected whenever parties
have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. We examine
the causes and reasons for this optimism. We then move to the analysis of the
recent literature that has challenged this view. These new contributions consider
the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the
presence of private information on the balance of strengths, that means that
conflict can convey information and potentially become a bargaining instrument.
We will contribute also with original research on this area. The chapter closes
with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces
and some potential avenues for further research.
2 Disagreement as an all-out conflict
The most basic setting concerns two risk neutral agents denoted by i ∈ {1, 2}
who attempt to resolve how to divide one dollar. For the time being, we will
assume that an all-out conflict ensues disagreement between these two agents.
Each of them has a strength si within the set of possible strengths is Si =
[si, si] ⊂ R+ and with S ≡ S1xS2. These strengths could be determined through
agents’ investments previous to bargaining, either by building arms, mobilizing
supporters or by hiring quality lawyers, but here we will take them as given.
If a settlement is not reached then both parties resort to confrontation and
fight an all-out conflict. After this conflict, no further interaction between them
is possible. Moreover, this conflict is costly. A fraction 1− θ of the dollar is lost
if it occurs, where 0 < θ < 1. This accounts for the fact that war may render
parts of the contested territory unproductive, legal services need to be paid and
firms output is reduced by strikes.
The outcome of the all-out conflict is determined by the relative strengths
of the parties, that is, it is determined by the balance of power. Given a pair
of strengths (s1, s2) ∈ S, the probability that agent 1 wins the all-out conflict
against agent 2 is p(s1, s2) ∈ [0, 1]. Agent 2 wins the conflict with probability
1 − p(s1, s2). We assume that agent i’s winning probability is strictly increas-
ing in his own strength and strictly decreasing in the strength of his opponent.
Hence, stronger agents potentially benefit more from engaging in conflict. One
possible formalization of this probability can be the class of Contest Success
Functions (CSFs) axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996), and in particular the dif-
ference functional form (Hirshleifer, 1991):
p(s1, s2) =
eγs1
eγs1 + eγs2
=
eγ(s1−s2)
eγ(s1−s2) + 1
, (1)
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where the decisiveness parameter γ ∈ [0,∞) measures how noisy the outcome of
the all-out conflict is: when γ = 0, it just becomes a fair lottery whereas when
γ →∞ it is won with certainty by the strongest agent.
Note that under full information, a peaceful agreement should always be
possible. If strengths are common knowledge, parties can easily compute their
expected payoﬀ from conflict. In line with Nash (1950), they are the disagree-
ment payoﬀs of our bargaining problem.
d = {d1, d2} = {θp(s1, s2), θ(1− p(s1, s2))}.
Then any division of the dollar that gives to each agent more than di con-
stitutes a potential peaceful agreement.
The presence incomplete information constitutes a fundamental problem
here. When strengths are private information to the parties, a range of poten-
tial peaceful agreements may not exist. Following the pioneer work of Harsanyi
(1967-68), let us identify strengths with "types" and assume that each agent
knows her own type but not necessarily their opponent’s. The distribution of
agent i type is fi(si) with full support in [si, si], that is, with fi(si) ∈ [0, 1] for
all types si ∈ Si and zero otherwise. These types are selected independently by
nature at the beginning of the game.
Given these beliefs about the strength of the opponent and their actual types
(s1, s2), agents can derive their expected payoﬀ from the all-out conflict:
E1(d1) = θE1(p) = θ
Z s2
s2
p(s1, s2)df2,
E2(d2) = θ(1−E2(p)) = θ(1−
Z s1
s1
p(s1, s2)df1).
Under these circumstances, agreement is impossible if beliefs are such that
E1(d1) + E2(d2) > 1, that after some rewriting becomesZ s2
s2
p(s1, s2)df2 −
Z s1
s1
p(s1, s2)df1 >
1− θ
θ
≡ R. (2)
We refer to R as the Loss ratio. A peaceful agreement becomes impossible
if the diﬀerence between the two agents’ expectations about agent 1 probability
of winning the conflict is too big. If both agents are very optimistic about their
own winning probability it is more likely that no settlement will satisfy both
of them at the same time. On the other hand, note that as the Loss ratio
increases, that is, as the all-out conflict becomes costlier, an agreement becomes
more likely to be possible.
The main question at this stage is thus whether it is possible to solve the
conflict of interests between the parties and to avoid a costly conflict, at least
partially. This is the purpose of the next section.
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3 The mechanism design approach
Mechanism design is a very powerful tool in the study of situations in which
there exists a conflict of interest among agents. Its goal is ambitious: To find
social contracts, peace-keeping institutions or arbitration bodies whose rules are
able to reduce, and even eliminate, the incidence of conflict.
This represents the normative side of mechanism design. However, this ap-
proach has also a positive side. It can be used also to derive very general results
of bargaining games. Mechanism design is a "game-free" approach, that is, it
does not posit any assumption on the specific bargaining process to be followed.
Because of that, this approach oﬀers a class of results that any equilibrium of
any unmeditated bargaining game must satisfy (Ausubel et al., 2002).
The generality of the mechanism design approach stems from the revelation
principle (Myerson, 1979). It states that we do not need to consider the poten-
tially very complex strategies that parties can follow. We can just restrict our
attention to mechanisms that ask participants to announce their types. And
within this class of mechanisms, called direct revelation mechanisms, we should
look for the ones that are (Bayesian) incentive compatible, that is, those that
make players reveal (and thus behave according to) their actual type.
The application of the tools of mechanism design to the study of conflict
was pioneered by Banks (1990). We will now follow him in the formalization
of the problem. A mechanism is a pair of functions < κ, π >: S → [0, 1]x[0, 1]
determining a division of our initial dollar and a probability of the all-out conflict
occurring. For each pair of reported types (s01, s02), the function κ(s01, s02) is the
share of the dollar received by Player 1 (Player 2 receives 1− κ(s01, s02)). With
probability π(s01, s
0
2) the conflict occurs, and then each player receives di.
Define now as
U1(s
0
1 | s1) =
Z s2
s2
[(1− π(s01, s2))κ(s01, s2)f2(s2)ds2 + π(s01, s2)d1]df2
=
Z s2
s2
(1− π(s01, s2))κ(s01, s2)df2 + θ
Z s2
s2
π(s01, s2)p(s1, s2)df2,
the expected utility of player 1 from announcing type s01, and
U1(s02 | s2) =
Z s1
s1
(1−π(s1, s02))(1−κ(s1, s02))df1+θ
Z s1
s1
π(s1, s02)(1−p(s1, s2))df1,
the analogous for player 2 when he announces type s02.
The mechanism < κ, π > is incentive compatible if for both types it is the
case that
Ui(si | si) ≥ Ui(s0i | si) for all si ∈ Si. (3)
The second type of restrictions we will impose on our mechanism is that
they must be individually rational, that is, they should give in expectation to
participants at least what they can obtain by triggering the all-out conflict. This
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was implicitly assumed in our initial analysis in the previous Section. Formally,
the participation constraints imply that
Ui(si | si) ≥ Ei(di) for all si ∈ Si. (4)
The fact that the all-out conflict is costly ensures that, contrary to Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983), a peaceful agreement is always ex-post eﬃcient. That
is why we can evaluate the quality of a mechanism by how likely it is to avoid
confrontation. In particular, we focus on mechanisms that are peaceful (Bester
and Warneryd, 2006), that is, mechanisms such that
π(s1, s2) = 0 for all (s1, s2) ∈ S.
Peaceful mechanisms are both ex-post and ex-ante eﬃcient. The problem is
that to impose participation constraints implies that when no mechanism can be
peaceful if there exists a realization of types such that agreement is impossible,
i.e. condition (2) holds, .
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold bR > 0 on the Loss ratio with
bR ≡ Z s2
s2
p(s1, s2)df2 −
Z s1
s1
p(s1, s2)df1, (5)
such that a peaceful mechanism exists if and only if R < bR.
The expression for bR comes naturally from (2): Given that p is strictly
increasing in s1 and strictly decreasing in s2, it is clear to see that for any
R ≤ bR a peaceful mechanism does not exist2.
When R > bR our mechanism must admit the occurrence of conflict for
some realizations of types. This is because if the all-out conflict is not too
destructive then it may become too attractive for stronger agents. Peace cannot
prevail when both highest types are drawn. This result was first stated by Spier
(1994) in the context of pretrial negotiations (where the all-out conflict takes
the form of going to court), and later by Fey and Ramsay (2009) in the context
of international relations. It fits with the idea that it was the Mutual Assured
Destruction what prevented the Cold War from escalating into a nuclear conflict;
such war would had been so destructive, i.e. the Loss ratio was close to infinity,
that a range of peaceful mechanisms surely existed. Let us reiterate that this
result is very general: the impossibility of peaceful mechanism applies to any
game in which the cost of an all-out conflict is small enough.
Note that the threshold bR potentially depends upon the technology of con-
flict and the distribution of types. For example, suppose that S1 ≡ S2 ≡ [0, 1]
and that p(s1, s2) takes the form in (1). Then it is easy to show that,
bR = 1
γ
(ln (eγ + 1) + ln
¡
e−γ + 1
¢
− 2 ln 2),
2That eR > 0 can be established just by seeing that eR > P (s1, s2)− P (s1, s2) = 0.
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that in turn is increasing in γ. In this case, as the decisiveness of the conflict
technology increases, the existence of a peaceful mechanism is less likely. The
intuition for this is that as γ the stronger types win the conflict with higher
probability and that make this option more attractive.
On the other hand, Bester and Warneryd (2006) explored what distribu-
tions of strengths make conflict more likely. This question has been central in
Political science for a long time and has produced all possible answers: The
preponderance-of-power school argues that when one of the parties is weak, it
is more likely to accept a negotiated settlement, whereas the balance-of-power
school argues that that has the opposite eﬀect because the stronger party will
demand more and those greater demands are more likely to be rejected3. The
results in Bester and Warneryd (2006) show that if the distribution of strengths
of one or both agents shift to the right according to the first order stochas-
tic dominance criterion, then bR decreases, making the existence of a peaceful
mechanism more likely. This implies that if one agent becomes relatively more
powerful than the other, peace is more likely to occur. This at first glance
supports the school that defends the preponderance of power as a guarantor of
peace. However, this conclusion would be wrong. Note that this result holds
regardless of whether the party that becomes more powerful was weaker or
stronger than her opponent. Then, the likelihood of conflict does not seem to
depend on the balance of strengths in a meaningful way (Wittman, 1979).
These authors also show that if the distributions of skills become riskier
according to the second order stochastic dominance criterion, that makes bR
increase and conflict more likely. This relates with the idea that incomplete
information diﬃcults agreement. When parties hold more precise information
about their opponents the potential for a peaceful settlement increases.
The next step is to characterize the mechanism. Recently, Frey and Ramsay
(2009) generalized the analysis of Banks (1990) along this line. The latter
author showed that when only of the parties is uninformed about the balance
of strengths then the mechanism must be monotonic, that is, the stronger the
informed player the more she receives in case of a peaceful settlement. This
generalizes to the case of two-sided incomplete information:
Proposition 2 Suppose that p(s1, s2) is continuously diﬀerentiable in s1 and
s2. Then
(i) Ui(s0i) = Ui(si) = Ei(di | si) for any s0i, si ∈ Si if a peaceful mechanism
exists,
(ii) Ui(s0i) > Ui(si) for s
0
i > si if a peaceful mechanism does not exist .
3Claude (1962) belong to the former school, whereas Organski and Kugler (1980) and
Blainey (1973) belong to the latter. The balance of power school received empirical support
in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1997).
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The intuition for this result is very simple. If a peaceful mechanism did oﬀer
diﬀerent equilibrium payoﬀs to diﬀerent types then the worst oﬀ types would
have an incentive to mimic the better oﬀ types. That is profitable because they
do not incur in any risk of conflict by doing that given that the mechanism
is peaceful. Moreover, the mechanism awards agents the expected payoﬀ from
the all-out conflict for the strongest types. Notice that this is feasible precisely
because a peaceful mechanism exists. When this is not the case, stronger types
must receive higher expected payoﬀs but this must be at the cost of a higher
probability of conflict. Type-contingent payoﬀs are necessary to elicit truth-
telling: Stronger players suﬀer a higher probability of conflict because that
reduces the incentive of weaker agents to exaggerate their report on their own
type. Better settlements on the other hand compensate stronger types for this
by giving them higher rents. This is called the risk-return trade-oﬀ.
Finally, let us clarify that the mechanism design approach does make as-
sumptions. As we will see next, it typically does assume a very basic structure.
In the case of bargaining and conflict, this structure follows the general setting
laid out in the previous section: One or both parties have private information
about their strength and a failure to strike a bargain provokes an all-out conflict
that is probabilistic and costly and that precludes any further interaction. Very
diﬀerent mechanism could be obtained if, as we will see in the next sections,
conflict is not a game-ending move.
4 Optimism as a cause of conflict
Let us now reflect on the analysis performed so far. Optimism emerges as a valid
explanation to the Hicks paradox. Excessive optimism can explain the paradox
without resorting to bounded rationality because it is capable of generating
incompatible demands. As we have seen in the previous section, and unlike in
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), breakdown of negotiations can occur despite
the existence of gains from trade being common knowledge.
Optimism has become a widespread explanation to the ubiquity of war. In
his now classic book, The Causes of War (1973) military historian Geoﬀrey
Blainey concluded that the main reason for armed conflicts throughout history
has been the high hopes that countries had in the eve of war, hopes that made
countries believe that they could achieve more through conflict than through
diplomacy. Because of that, it was impossible to bring one or both of them to
the bargaining table. Since then, mutual optimism has been widely cited as
a source of interstate war (Wittman, 1979). In the previous Section we have
seen that one-sided incomplete information is able to generate this result. So
optimism does not even need to be mutual to preclude agreements.
One important question, specially when looking at particular applications, is
where does this optimism come from. Following the influential study by Fearon
(1995), let us discuss three main answers.
The first one follows the standard argument of economists: parties just hold
diﬀerent information. Otherwise they should have exactly the same estimates
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about winning the conflict, that is, the should have common priors (Harsanyi,
1967-68). Superior information can stem from a better knowledge of military ca-
pabilities, resilience of union members in case of a protracted strike or exclusive
evidence that litigants may hold about the case. Incomplete information comes
thus from a diﬀerence between observable and non-observable capabilities.
The second set of explanations does not discard that agents hold potentially
the same information about the balance of strengths. It assumes instead that
they reach diﬀerent estimates because they process information diﬀerently. One
reason for this comes from relaxing the assumption of unitary actors: Military
assessors, factions within political parties or lawyers may distort decision making
within organizations. As Blainey (1973) pointed out, political leaders tend to
be surrounded by people who feed them with mostly positive information rather
than with realistic estimates. Another reason is that information acquisition and
processing is costly. Decision makers face such a volume of information that they
make mistakes when they compute estimates. All these reasons contribute to
generate what Schelling (1960) called an "imperfect process of decision."
The third type of explanations states that parties somehow neglect infor-
mation. Blainey (1973) believed that nationalism and patriotism often made
leaders "evade reality" and get carried away by animal spirits. For instance,
it seems that racial stereotypes where at the root of the Russian optimism on
the eve of the Russian-Japanese war of 1904 and on MacArthur overconfidence
before the Korean War. On the other hand, Goemans (2000) argued that weak
autocrats have often used war as a gamble to ensure their political survival
despite obvious and evident unfavorable odds. This is because, as democratic
leaders, they are likely to lose power in case of a defeat. But contrary to elected
politicians, being overthrown may entail severe domestic punishments. This can
lead them to neglect "hard" information. Finally, Johnson (2004) uses recent
advances in evolutionary psychology to argue that overconfidence in conflict was
an adaptive trait in our evolutionary past. Optimistic assessments of the own
strength enhance performance and the probability of winning confrontation and
that explain their pervasiveness.
However, note that although these three explanations can account for dif-
ferences in parties’ estimates, they do not preclude that agents act rationally.
Contrary to what Fearon (1995) argues, it may be perfectly rational for parties
to have diﬀerent estimates even when they have the same information. The
non-unitary actor or the political survival hypotheses can deliver that4. But, to
a certain extent, the causes of optimism are not ultimately important. It may be
that parties holds optimistic beliefs because there is an innate human tendency
towards "positive illusions" and self-deception. But that does not preclude that,
given those beliefs, parties can still make rational choices and play their best
response to whatever their opponents do. An investigation on the likely causes
of optimism can shed light on how parties factor in the new information that
they learn through the bargaining process into their decisions.
4The non-unitary actor explanation for optimism, although outside the scope of this chap-
ter, deserves extensive consideration.
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The next question is under which circumstances should we expect optimism.
The causes of optimism can also tell us when it is more likely to emerge. Ac-
cording to the non-unitary actors hypothesis, excessive demands will take place
when parties’s decision process is not transparent and the internal debate is not
open. That has led Johnson (2004) to conjecture that optimism is more likely
to occur in dictatorial regimes than in democratic ones, because in the latter
overconfident leaders can be better counteracted. On the other hand, Blainey
(1973) argued that optimism is more likely when power is distributed equally.
Wagner (1994) built up on this by making the distinction between observable
and unobservable capabilities. When the balance of the former is more equal,
the role of the latter should be more important and hence the more likely is
that parties will feel optimistic. If the balance of observable capabilities is very
unequal, then the importance of unobservable characteristics should be much
smaller and hence optimism must be less likely to precipitate war. However,
this hypothesis is problematic: There exists many contexts in which one can
observe clearly small and weak agents fighting against much larger and power-
ful ones; cases range from David against Goliath to the Vietcong against the
US. This phenomenon was first noted by Clausewitz (1832) and is commonly
referred to as the Uneven contenders paradox (Sanchez-Pages, 2003, and Jack-
son and Morelli, 2007). Hence, any model that explores the relation between
conflict and incomplete information should be able to oﬀer an explanation to
this puzzle. We will elaborate more on this later on.5
The reader may be perplexed at this point. It seems that each time in-
complete information render parties’ demands incompatible confrontation will
ensue. Conflict is however known to be a destructive option and it is there-
fore common knowledge that there must exist some Pareto superior agreement.
This was precisely what puzzled Hicks in the first place and what had lead
some authors to look at the optimism hypothesis with distrust. By observing
a mutual willingness to fight, parties should be able to infer that optimism is
prevalent and that should lead them to revise their demands, up to a point in
which one of them prefers to settle (Fey and Ramsay, 2007). This is just the
logical extension of Aumann’s (1976) idea that rational players should never
"agree to disagree" when their rationality is common knowledge. Whereas this
argument is not valid in the context of conflict, it allows us to understand better
the pervasiveness of conflict despite the apparent paradox.
Firstly, confrontation, although mutual in essence (it occurs only if at least
two parties fight), can be imposed by just one party. So even if one of the
parties prefers to settle, the other will continue fighting if by doing so he thinks
that he can obtain a better deal. But more importantly, parties always have
an incentive to display a willingness to fight because they have an incentive to
misrepresent their private information. As we saw in the previous section, a
peaceful mechanism must be flat because otherwise players have an incentive to
bluﬀ and exaggerate their strength. The possibility of conflict occurring was the
5Wrangham (1999) explain this paradox in terms of the evolutionary adaptiveness of mil-
itary incompetence. He argues that agents are more likely to become military or political
leaders if they have positive illusions and tend to deceive themselves more often.
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only way in which truth-telling could be elicited. If negotiation fails then parties
must commit to fight (and suﬀer the costs from it). Otherwise their demands
cannot be credible. No cheap-talk type of communication, no declaration of
intentions can help to avert confrontation by itself. When optimism precipitates
conflict, it is very likely that one party will regret it because the fact that
hostilities began proves that her expectations were wrong.
Learning seems then the only way out from the gloomy prospect of an all-out
conflict. The next section describes models of sequential bargaining in which
parties can learn form disagreement or can try to signal credibly their private
information through the process of negotiation. After that, we will describe a
second and, until recently, neglected source of information: conflict itself.
5 Learning by bargaining
In retrospect, mechanism design may be regarded as "too general", because it
can not incorporate important features of specific applications. One could argue
that models that make explicit and detailed assumptions about the bargaining
protocol are richer and perhaps more "realistic". But at the same time they
may not be robust or their equilibria may be diﬃcult to find, something that
ultimately reduces their potential applicability. Banks (1990) himself advocated
a "two-step" approach: Mechanism design should be used first to establish
general results and then additional predictions should be obtained from using a
game form that captures the main features of the application of interest.
But there exists a second and important motivation for the analysis of se-
quential models of bargaining: Parties can learn about each other through the
process of negotiation itself, a possibility that was advanced by Schelling (1960)
in Economics and Pillar (1983) in International Relations. Parties can update
their prior information by observing the oﬀers that are on the table or from
the rejection of the oﬀers they made to their opponents. Hence, agreements
must incorporate the information that players learn through the process of bar-
gaining. Notice that mechanism design cannot tackle this issue appropriately.
It assumes no structure in the process of bargaining so it cannot yield specific
predictions about how this learning takes place. Sequential bargaining is much
better suited to analyze this issue in particular.
Sequential bargaining models with incomplete information flourished in the
80s. In them, negotiations occurs through a dynamic process of bilateral negoti-
ations according to a pre-specified protocol and under a particular informational
structure. Two main protocols are mainly considered: one-sided oﬀers and al-
ternating oﬀers. On the other hand, incomplete information could be one-sided
or two-sided. This spawns four possible bargaining structures. In this Section
we will consider two of them in detail: When oﬀers are made only by the in-
formed party and when they are made only by the uninformed party. We will
adapt these standard bargaining models to the analysis of conflict. In the last
part of the Section we will also discuss other protocols.
In order to simplify the exposition, we will consider models with only two
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periods. Hence t = 1, 2. Players are impatient and discount the future at a
common factor δ ∈ [0, 1]. In each period only one oﬀer can be on the table. An
oﬀer xt ∈ [0, 1] specifies the share of the cake that Player 1 will receive if the
oﬀer made at period t is accepted . His payoﬀ is then δtxt. Player 2 in that case
receives δt(1− xt). If none of the two oﬀers is accepted then the all-out conflict
takes place and the game ends.
For the sake of exposition we will collapse the distribution of types into a two
type support, so Si = {si, si}.When one of the strengths is common knowledge,
Player 1’s probability of victory in the all-out conflict can thus be reduced to
p ∈ {pL, pH} with 1 > pH > pL > 0. So instead of specifying priors over the
strength of the informed party, we will just specify them over p at the beginning
of the game: the uninformed party believes it to be pH with probability µo and
pL with probability 1− µo.
A history h(t) of the game specifies at t the oﬀers made so far and whether
they were accepted or rejected. Beliefs consist then of a probability distribution
µ(· | h(t)) over the set of types. Hence, a strategy for the player making the
oﬀers is a map from the set of histories and types into the set of actions {x1, x2}.
Similarly, a strategy for the player that receives the oﬀers is a map from the set
of histories into {Accept, Reject}.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is the standard equilibrium concept employed
in this type of games. It consists of a strategy profile and a system of beliefs
that are consistent with each other via Bayes’ rule and such that all players are
playing best responses to each other given those beliefs. This concept requires
that we specify even oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path beliefs since Bayes’ rule imposes
no restriction on them. This leads to a multiplicity of equilibria that pervades
most of the bargaining literature (Ausubel et al., 2002)
5.1 The uninformed party makes all the oﬀers
The following follows the analysis in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), extended by
Sobel and Takahashi (1983) to a continuum of types and an infinite horizon. The
dynamics of negotiation in these models take the form of screening: The unin-
formed party makes oﬀers that are accepted first by players with a lower outside
option. Learning occurs through negotiations: a rejection can potentially signal
that the informed party has a high value from resorting to the all-out conflict.
In turn, that prompts the uninformed party to concede and raise their initial
oﬀer. Therefore, three situations may arise: Agreement is reached in the first
round, after and impasse or never. The final outcome depends on the incentives
of the uninformed player, Player 2 in our case, to engage in screening.
The strategies for Player 1 are the probabilities of accepting the oﬀer at
each period. Let us denote them as {qL1(x1), qL2(x2)} and {qH1(x1), qH2(x2)}
for types L and H respectively. No oﬀer will be greater than θpH . Hence we
know that qH1(x1) = 1 for x1 ≥ δθpH and 0 otherwise. Hence, we only need to
care about qL1(x1).
Rejection of the oﬀer conveys information about the type of Player 1. Given
the initial beliefs about Player 1 being strong, Player 2’s beliefs in the second
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stage are just
µ(H | qL1) = µoµo + (1− µo)(1− qL1)
, (6)
which is greater than µo. At the second stage, type i will accept the oﬀer x2 if
and only if x2 ≥ θpi. Oﬀers by Player 2 will then only take two values, θpL and
θpH . It will be the latter if and only if
µ(H | qL1) ≥ pH − pLR+ pH − pL ,
where recall that R is the loss ratio. Suppose that this the case. Then, both
types of Player 1 will accept the first period oﬀer if and only if x1 ≥ ex1 = δθpH .
Hence ex1 is a pooling oﬀer that is accepted by both types immediately. If we
specify that in case of an oﬀ-the-equilibrium path rejection, Player 2 believes
she is facing a strong opponent then this pooling oﬀer constitutes a candidate
for a sequential equilibrium.
Now assume that Player 2 oﬀers x2 = θpL. That can happen if and only if
qL1 ≤ q ≡ 1−
µo
1− µo
R
pH − pL
= 1− µo
RbR,
where the last inequality just comes from rewriting (5) in the current setup. Note
that if the L type is randomizing it must be that x1 = δθpL. Hence, a second
candidate for equilibrium arises is a separating one, in which Player 2 oﬀers δθpL
in period 1 that the H type rejects and the L type accepts with probability q
(since that leaves indiﬀerent Player 2 between his two possible oﬀers at t =
2). The following results summarizes this findings and fully characterizes the
conditions under which each of these candidates constitutes an equilibrium.
Proposition 3 In the two-period game in which the uninformed party makes
all oﬀers, for low values of the loss ratio, i.e. R ≤ eRµo , there exists a threshold
discount rate
δµo ≡
µo
µo +
eR
R
eR
R−µo
1+
eR
R−µo
,
such that if δ ≥ δµo the separating profile of oﬀers is the unique equilibrium.
Otherwise, the pooling oﬀer constitutes the unique equilibrium.
The pooling profile implies that a settlement is reached immediately and
conflict does not occur. This is what we already obtained in Section 3: Conflict
is averted if the cost of the all-out conflict is high enough. Otherwise, conflict
occurs because Player 2 prefers to take a calculated risk: He discriminates
between the two types of Player 1 by making a low oﬀer in period one and
a higher one in period 2, but not high enough to appease the strong type so
conflict occurs with probability µo. This risk is necessary for this profile to be
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an equilibrium. If Player 2 were to appease the H type by making a high oﬀer
in the second period, the L type could mimic him by rejecting x1. In addition,
one can easily show that δµo is increasing in µo, so peace becomes more likely
the more likely Player 2 believes Player 1 to be of the strong type.
This also shows that the feasibility of an agreement, in the sense of R ≤ bR
is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for a settlement to occur. Player 2
can engage in separation when the cost of conflict is moderate, i.e. R ∈ ( bR, eRµo ).
This is because he can obtain a better deal by being deliberately tough, even
though that entails the risk of an all-out conflict with the strong type.
In the context of bilateral trade, Sobel and Takahashi (1983) showed that
with infinitely many periods and a continuum of types, the uninformed seller
uses an ascending profile of oﬀers, that gradually appease buyers with higher
reservation values. Low valuation buyers wait to get a better price and use delay
as a signal of their valuation. As noted by Kennan and Wilson (1993), this
provides some foundations to the observation that unions make lower demands
on wages as strikes progress (the decreasing union "resistance curve" described
by Hicks, 1932), or to the fact that initially demanding countries concede more
to their rivals as hostilities last longer (Slantchev, 2004). This result rests on the
fact that delay is more costly for high valuation buyers or more profitable firms.
As the time between oﬀer becomes smaller, or alternatively, as the discount
factor approaches one, delay is less eﬀective in screening types and the "Coase
conjecture" applies (Coase, 1972): agreement is immediate. Ultimately, this
implies that disagreement can be sustained only if there exists an exogenously
imposed lapse between oﬀers. However, the Coase conjecture does not hold in
models of bargaining under the shadow of conflict because time itself does not
help parties to screen their opponents.
5.2 The informed party makes all the oﬀers.
When the uninformed agents makes all oﬀers, he learns from disagreement; the
informed party can, to a certain extent, signal credibly his type by rejecting
the first period oﬀer. This enabled the uninformed agent to screen the type of
their opponent. On the other hand, when the informed party is the one making
the oﬀers, information is conveyed through oﬀers themselves. Then signaling
occurs. Next we will follow a modified version of the model in Sanchez-Pages
(2009) to describe this bargaining problem.
Let us first show that a two-period separation profile, in which the weak
type settles immediately and the strong type settles at t = 2 after making a non
serious oﬀer at t = 1 cannot be an equilibrium. The reason is straightforward.
In that case, Player 2 knows he is facing the H type in period 2 so it must
be that x2 ≥ 1 − θ(1 − pH). For this equilibrium to exist it must be that
x1 ≥ δ(1 − θ(1 − pH)), because otherwise the L type could be better oﬀ by
mimicking the behavior of H. But if that is the case then the H type himself has
an incentive to mimic L and settle immediately. This implies that the informed
party cannot use time to credibly signal its type. Sanchez-Pages (2009) argues
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that this is a very general property of this type of bargaining models.
Hence, only two types of profiles can constitute an equilibrium. Both types
should make the same oﬀer at t = 1 (the two-type assumption precludes the
construction of a fully revealing schedule of oﬀers), or the L type settles at
t = 1 and the strong one makes a series of non serious oﬀers that precipitates
conflict. Two elements are critical here. First, how the second period unravels.
If the second period is reached because both types made the same oﬀer at
t = 1, posterior beliefs coincide with priors and time does not transmit any
information. Given that, the minimal acceptable oﬀer to Player 2 is simply
ex2 = 1− θ(1− µopH − (1− µo)pL).
For it to be a candidate for an equilibrium, the H type must prefer to make
it than to make an non-serious oﬀer, i.e. x2 = 0, that would precipitate conflict.
That is, ex2 ≥ θpH ⇔ R ≥ bR.
For some other range of parameters, separation can occur at t = 2. Type L
can reveal his true type by making an oﬀer x2 = x = 1− θ(1− pL).But it must
be such that H type would never make it, that is, x < θpH . This implies that
separation can be sustained only when
R < pH − pL =
bR
1− µo
.
Under these two scenarios, the expected payoﬀ for Player 2 from rejecting
a pooling oﬀer at t = 1 is just 1− ex2. So immediate settlement can occur only
if x1 ≤ 1 − δ + δex2. Whether this scenario arises or not will depend on the
discount factor.
The second element to be considered are beliefs. Recall that the PBE concept
does not impose any restrictions on beliefs oﬀ-the-equilibrium path. This gives
rise to a multiplicity of equilibria. These beliefs are critical and the equilibrium
outcomes are quite sensitive to their specification. For our purposes consider
the following set of "reasonable" beliefs:
µ(H | x1 ≤ 1− δ + δx) = µ1 ∈ [0, µo]. (7)
These beliefs are "reasonable" because they assume that if Player 2 observes
any serious oﬀer at t = 1, that is, an oﬀer not smaller than his absolute minimal
acceptable oﬀer at that time, he does not believe that he is more likely to be
facing the strong type than at t = 0. We will require that these beliefs will be
maintained in t = 2.
Now we are in the position of characterizing a set of PBE of this game
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Proposition 4 In the two-period game in which the informed party makes all
oﬀers and the uninformed player holds beliefs (7), for low enough values of the
loss ratio, i.e. R ≤ eR1−µ0 , there exists a threshold discount rate
δµ1 ≡
1 +R
1 +R+ 1−µ11−µ0
bR,
such that if δ ≥ δµ1 the L types oﬀers x1 = 1−δ+δx and the H type precipitates
conflict in the PBE of the game. Otherwise, both types oﬀer x1 = 1 − δ + δex2
and the uninformed agent accepts.
Note that it is again the case that the feasibility of agreement is not enough
to ensure a peaceful settlement. That can be the case only if µ1 = µo.When the
conflict loss is small and the discount factor is high enough so the H type cannot
be satisfied with any acceptable agreement for Player 2, then conflict happens
with probability µ0. The reason for this, again, lies in the fact that the strong
type cannot use time to separate himself from the weak type. When conflict
and delay are not too costly, conflict becomes inevitable. This is aggravated by
beliefs: The more likely Player 2 thinks he is facing a weak rival after observing
a serious oﬀer the smaller the sets of parameters under which immediate agree-
ment occurs. In that sense, these beliefs become self-fulfilling: only weak types
make an oﬀer in the first period, whereas the strong types resort to conflict.
The fact that the passage of time cannot convey information is an unsat-
isfactory feature of this model. That cannot explain why sometimes, after a
long period of hostilities, one party accepts an agreement with terms identical
to those proposed before confrontation started. The negotiations between Israel
and Egypt during the 70s or between the IRA and the British government in the
90s found a breakthrough only after a protracted confrontation. The fact that
the agreements finally reached almost mirrored the initial proposals suggests
that parties needed time to reveal substantive information about their stands.
This is the precisely starting point of the article by Heifetz and Segev (2005),
who extend the classic analysis on signaling in bargaining by Admati and Perry
(1987) to the study of escalation and conflict. In their model incomplete infor-
mation is about the reservation stand of one of the parties. The informed agent
can choose the timing of his oﬀer so that self-imposed delay credibly signals his
reservation stand. The uninformed one has also the opportunity to become the
aggressor and impose an escalation of the conflict, which implies imposing costs
to both parties. In the equilibrium of the game, agreement follows after the first
oﬀer, although low valuation types wait longer. The eﬀect of escalation in the
model is that it makes agreement to be reached sooner, because parties find de-
lay more costly, and that it may improve the terms of the agreement. However,
this option does not necessarily benefit the aggressor. The authors characterize
conditions under which he can regret ex-post his decision to escalate.
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5.3 Other bargaining protocols
In an influential article, Powell (1996) explored an infinite horizon bargaining
model with two-sided incomplete information and alternating oﬀers. In that
model, parties can exchange oﬀers or impose a settlement (an all-out conflict)
when they become too pessimistic about the outcome of the negotiations. The
costs of imposing this settlement are private information to the parties. In
fact, incomplete information on the costs of conflict rather than on the balance
of strengths is the typical modelling choice of political scientists (Brito and
Intriligator, 1985, Fearon, 1995). Whereas this feature is, to a large extent,
just a matter of taste, exploring the similarities between these two formulations
is an avenue for further research6. Powell’s model displays two distinguished
features that will give us the opportunity to discuss two important aspects of
negotiations under the shadow of conflict.
First, he assumes that the party that makes the oﬀer can also impose a
settlement. In contrast, the models described above implied an exogenously
imposed deadline to negotiations. That may fit situations in which a third party
(an international organization, an arbitration body) is imposing a negotiation
protocol, or parties agree on using a particular one. But that begs the question
of why such process was agreed upon. But, more in general, assuming that the
unilateral use of confrontation is always an option for parties makes perfect sense
in the context of conflict. Powell (1996) shows that this assumption reduces
considerably the potential complexity of his model. In the end, the equilibrium
outcome is unique and involves one party making a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that
his opponent can accept or reject by imposing a settlement. This contrasts with
the results in bargaining models of bilateral trade (Fudenberg et al., 1987) or in
pretrial negotiations (Spier, 1992) in which adding an outside option creates a
multiplicity of equilibria.7
It is easy to see that this property generalizes to the protocols considered
above. When the uninformed party makes all the oﬀers, the separating equilib-
rium vanishes because the strong type does not need to wait until the second
period to precipitate conflict. Hence, the game collapses into one with a take-
it-or leave oﬀer: Depending on the parameters, the uninformed party either
makes a pooling oﬀer or one that only the weak types accepts. Sanchez-Pages
(2009) shows that the same happens in the game in which the informed party
makes all the oﬀers. The strong type does not need to make two non serious
oﬀers to trigger conflict; he does it immediately unless a pooling oﬀer can leave
him better-oﬀ. Then agreement or disagreement must be immediate. A further
implication of this result is that it is possible to obtain fundamental properties
of bargaining situations in the shadow of conflict by looking just at the single-
6Fey and Ramsay (2009) compare the two under the mechanism design approach and
obtain significantly diﬀerent results.
7 In a recent article, Leventoglu and Tarar (2008) show that this simplicity disappears if the
model is extended by considering that war can happen at any point of the game and not only
after oﬀers are made. They obtain qualitatively diﬀerent equilibria, including one in which
war does not happen and several oﬀers are exchanged, a feature that is commonly not present
in models of bargaining under the shadow of conflict.
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oﬀer case. The papers by Brito and Intriligator (1985) and Fearon (1995) in
international conflict or by Bebchuk (1984) and Schweizer (1989) on pretrial
negotiations can thus oﬀer important insights despite the apparent simplicity of
their single-oﬀer setup.
A second important feature of Powell (1996) is that there exists a previous
status-quo that parties aim to revise. This assumption is very common in the
international relations literature because in reality states tend to bargain over
pre-existing issues. This status-quo defines who is the dissatisfied agent at
any point in time and ultimately determines who makes the take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer and the likelihood of conflict. But the existence of a status-quo allocation
can have deeper implications on the bargaining process. The fact that a party
triggers a crisis can convey information. Let us go back to the mechanism design
approach: Banks (1990) briefly considered the idea of the informed party having
a status-quo payoﬀ. Resorting to a mechanism, or to a bargaining protocol, to
solve a dispute means that that party expects to get from doing so at least what
he obtains from the status-quo. And that in turn should aﬀect the prior beliefs
of the uninformed party in case negotiations commence. This corresponds to
the "selection bias" observed in the political science literature (Morrow, 1989).
Given that, as we have seen in the models discussed above, stronger parties enjoy
greater benefits from bargaining, conditional on a crisis occurring, posterior
beliefs of the uninformed party should put more weight on stronger types.
6 Learning by fighting
6.1 Limited conflict as part of the bargaining process
So far we have approached conflict purely as a fight to the finish that takes
place once parties fail to reach an agreement completely. This approach how-
ever is very limited. Evidence shows that parties continue negotiating after a
clash starts and that most wars end with a negotiated settlement (Pillar 1983,
Kecskemeti, 1958). Assuming that conflict is just a game-ending move, a fi-
nal outcome that precludes any further interaction, limits the analysis to the
initiation of conflict and leaves out the study of how and why conflicts end.
But, most importantly, it neglects another source of learning under incomplete
information: conflict itself. When conflict is final no further learning can occur
after it starts. But if we admit that bargaining can continue after conflict takes
place then, we are allowing parties to learn new information by fighting.
The critical element here is to recognize that parties can choose the scope
of the conflicts they fight. An all-out conflict is a possibility, but not the only
one. Countries, political parties, married couples, unions and litigants engage
in limited confrontations that do not preclude the continuation of negotiations.
Skirmishes and battles, family arguments, holdouts or discovery procedures con-
stitute limited forms of confrontation in war, marriages, labour negotiations and
legal disputes respectively. After these clashes, negotiations over territories,
chores, wages and compensations can resume. This distinction between all-out
18
and limited conflicts was first noticed by Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal
book On War (1832). He coined the term "Absolute war" to refer to duels in
which parties tried to disarm each other completely so they could impose their
will on their rival without opposition. And he employed the term "Real war" to
refer to those restrained confrontations (Schelling, 1966) that do not preclude
a later agreement because parties "employ no more strength than is absolutely
necessary" and that are fought to alter the perceptions and beliefs of the enemy.
This distinction is vital when incomplete information is present because
"real" or limited conflicts reveal information about the power and resolve of
the parties involved. It was the great German sociologist Georg Simmel who
seventy years after Clausewitz, took further these ideas and in his work The
Sociology of Conflict (1904, p. 501) pointed out the following: ”the most eﬀec-
tive prerequisite for preventing struggle, the exact knowledge of the comparative
strength of the two parties, is very often attainable only by the actual fighting
out of the conflict”. Paradoxically, the occurrence of conflict is at the same
time a necessary conclusion and a solution to the problem of optimism. Again
seventy years later, Blainey (1973) pursued this provocative idea and asserted
that ”war itself provides the stinging ice of reality”, because it helps to dissolve
optimism and conflicting expectations about the outcome of war.
The idea of two diﬀerent levels of conflict had been considered in the Eco-
nomics literature by Cramton and Tracy (1992), who presented a model in
which unions could choose the intensity of the labour dispute by opting between
strikes and holdouts. However, it was Wagner (2000) who first put together all
these ideas within the framework of bargaining with incomplete information. If
the outcome of limited conflicts is related to the outcome of absolute ones via
strengths, he said, then fighting will change parties beliefs about the outcome of
the potential all-out conflict. In consequence, disputants will be able to modify
their demands during the course of the negotiation according to the events in
the battlefield. In this sense, conflict is part of the bargaining process.
Limited confrontations create a type of information substantially diﬀerent
from the one transmitted through oﬀers and rejections. The latter type of infor-
mation is "soft" because it is highly manipulable and that in turn allows beliefs
to generate multiple equilibria. The battlefield, on the other hand, provides
noisy but non-manipulable information: Two types can behave in exactly the
same manner but the events on the battlefield will discriminate between them.
For instance, when the uninformed party receives a pooling oﬀer, his posterior
beliefs should remain unchanged. But if rejection triggers a battle, its outcome
will induce him to revise his beliefs. Hence, models that incorporate both oﬀers
and limited confrontations allow parties to face conflicting bits of information; a
rejected oﬀer may convey strength but a defeat in a skirmish signals weakness.
The seminal work by Wagner spawned a second generation of bargaining
models in which conflict was no longer necessarily final and in which parties
used the information generated in the battlefield. In most of these models,
limited conflicts or battles are a by-product of disagreement because they only
take place after the rejection of an oﬀer.
Filson and Werner (2002) explored a model of screening very similar to the
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one considered above with the addition that a battle takes place after rejection
of the first oﬀer. The probability of each agent winning that conflict depends
upon the type of the informed player. Hence, after a rejection, the uninformed
party learns information also through the outcome of the limited conflict. A
victory makes the uninformed party more demanding next period whereas a
defeat reduces his demands. The equilibrium profile of the game consists of an
increasing schedule of oﬀers and a battle. Hence, both conflict and a peaceful
schedule of oﬀers coexist along the equilibrium path. Apart from that, this
equilibrium displays qualitatively the same features as the one in the model
without the battle: an increase in the prior probability that Player 2 attaches
to the strong type makes agreement more likely.
On the other hand, Smith and Stam (2003) developed an infinite horizon
model in which information transmission only occurs in the battlefield. They
proposed a random-walk model of conflict in which multiple battles are possible.
These skirmishes enable parties to capture "forts" -landmarks, resources- such
that they can totally defeat their opponent by capturing all of them. The
authors then focus on the process of fighting and how limited confrontations
shape agreements and the duration of hostilities. This formulation provides
a simple characterization of optimal behavior, simply based on the number
of forts hold at a particular time. This is because the authors assume that
both parties have complete information about their probabilities of prevailing
in each of this small conflicts but their estimates are heterogenous. That is,
they hold non-common priors or, in Aumann’s (1976) words, they "agree to
disagree" on the balance of strengths. That simplifies the problem generated by
"soft" information and ultimately makes the model very mechanistic. But, most
importantly, this common knowledge of non-common prior constitutes a very
problematic assumption and it is ultimately incompatible with full rationality.
However, it helps the authors to generate a very important observation: parties
keep triggering battles as long as the continuation value of doing so exceeds the
one from settling, independently of whether optimism is present or not. Realistic
oﬀers are postponed until both parties find that the amount they expect to
extract from their opponent by fighting an additional battle is oﬀset by its
costs8. We will elaborate more on this next.
6.2 Limited conflict as a bargaining tool
Assuming that limited conflicts are a by-product of disagreement is certainly a
step forward. But it fails to asses fully the role of conflict in negotiations. In
the models just mentioned, the impact of confrontation is limited to the com-
putation of the oﬀers that make the opponent indiﬀerent between acceptance
8Slantchev (2003) extended Smith and Stam (2003) by assuming common priors. He
employed an alternating-oﬀers protocol so the informed party can screen her opponent and
the uninformed signals her type through non-serious oﬀers. Hence, information transmission
occurs both in the battlefield and in the bargaining table. The author shows that when
players are suﬃciently patient the uninformed party engages in costly separation of types in
the equilibrium of the game.
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and rejection. Leventoglu and Tarar (2008) argue that this formulation is un-
satisfactory because it still builds in the risk-return trade-oﬀ that characterize
the models in which conflict is final. The uninformed party engages in screening
depending on the risk of losing the limited conflict, that in turn depends upon
the degree of optimism. These models can thus account for the simultaneous
occurrence of conflict and diplomacy and for the occurrence of final conflicts,
but do not generate equilibrium paths along which oﬀers are peacefully made,
simply because conflict is assumed to take place after an oﬀer is rejected.
However, there is a second and more important reason to consider limited
conflicts as an option in itself. When limited conflict is just a by-product of
disagreement a convergence in the estimates of the balance of strengths can
be enough to ensure agreement. This was certainly the view held by Blainey
(1973). He claimed that "wars usually cease when the fighting nations agree
on their relative strength". If that is the case, a limited conflict cannot lead
to ineﬃciencies that were not present when it was not available. However,
as Clausewitz (1832) and Wittman (1979) later pointed out, if parties can use
conflict to screen their opponents or alter their expectations about the balance of
power, the incentives to use confrontation as a bargaining tool may remain even
when optimism has vanished because parties can use confrontation to extract
better terms from the opponent. It is the fact that, paraphrasing Clausewitz,
conflict is the continuation of diplomacy with the addition of other means, what
ultimately explains the pervasiveness of conflict in negotiations.
Next, we will develop two simple models that extend the ones considered in
the previous Section by assuming that the party that makes the oﬀers can also
trigger a limited conflict. Depending on the information structure, this limited
confrontation becomes either a screening device or a credible signal. We then
use the result obtained to shed light on some of the issues discussed so far.
6.2.1 Conflict as a screening device
Let us come back to the model of screening that we discussed in the previous
Section: We will now assume that the uninformed party has two available actions
at t = 1: He can make an oﬀer x1 or trigger the battle, in which case the game
proceeds to t = 2.. The battle is a confrontation of limited scope that, contrary
to the all-out conflict, does not entail the end of the game. We abstract from
a specific interpretation of the battle; nature simply announces a winner and
the second period is reached. Then, standard bargaining (oﬀers) can take place
both before and after hostilities have begun.
The outcome of this battle is related to the outcome of the all-out conflict via
players’ strengths. For simplicity, we will assume that the conflict technology
is identical across the two types of confrontations. But that is not necessary.
All that is needed is a correlation between the two, even a negative one9. Thus
we will assume that Player 1’s probability of winning the battle is pL or pH
depending on his type.
9 In military strategy it is often argued that the likelihood of success in guerrilla warfare is
inversely related to the likelihood of victory in an open battlefield.
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After the battle, two new information sets emerge depending on its outcome
from Player 1’s perspective: Victory (V) or Defeat (D). Therefore, the outcome
of the battle conveys information about Player 1’s type. Player 2, the one
making the oﬀers, will revise his beliefs taking this into account.
A history of the game at t = 2 can now consist of a rejected oﬀer or the
outcome of the battle. In the first case, Player 2’s beliefs are identical to the
ones in (6). In case a battle takes place beliefs are:
µ(H | V ) ≡ µ+ = µopH
µopH + (1− µo)pL
, (8)
µ(H | D) ≡ µ− = µo(1− pH)
µo(1− pH) + (1− µo)(1− pL)
.
A straightforward comparison with (6) shows that a victory (defeat) of Player
1 in the battle makes Player 2 believe he is more (less) likely to be facing a strong
opponent. Hence, a pooling oﬀer may emerge under one or the two outcomes.
But given that µ+ > µ−, a pooling oﬀer will take place in both scenarios if and
only if.
µ− ≥ pH − pL
R+ pH − pL
⇔ R ≥
bR
µo
1− pL
1− pH
.
When the Loss ratio is suﬃciently high, Player 2 prefers not to risk conflict by
making an oﬀer that will be rejected by the strong type. Otherwise, a separating
oﬀer can occur under V or in both scenarios. This is intuitive: Under V, Player
2 becomes more pessimistic about his prospects in case of an all-out conflict and
is ready to make better oﬀers. On the other hand, under D, he becomes more
optimistic and thus more demanding, so conflict may become inevitable.
On the other hand, the case in which oﬀers under both scenarios are sepa-
rating occurs if and only if
µ+ ≤ pH − pL
R+ pH − pL
⇔ R ≤
bR
µo
pL
pH
,
and pooling under V and separation under D occurs in the remaining case.
Alternatively, Player 2 can just make an oﬀer in period one. That will
generate strategy profiles identical to the ones described in the model without
the battle. Player 2 will choose the option that maximizes his payoﬀ. Note
then that he model still gives room to a peaceful exchanges of oﬀers. It is
straightforward to show that if the battle generates pooling or separation under
both outcomes, triggering it is a dominated action. It can only benefit Player
2 in the intermediate case, when it helps him to screen his opponent. The next
result characterizes conditions under which that constitutes an equilibrium. It
does it in terms of the discount rate, that now has a natural interpretation: The
cost of the battle. So the battle can only be part of an equilibrium profile if its
cost is not too high.
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Proposition 5 In the game in which the uninformed party makes all the oﬀers
and the battle is available, triggering the battle
(i) Dominates a pooling oﬀer if and only if
δ ≥ δ0µo ≡
1
1 + bR(1− pL)−Rµo(1− pH) .
(ii) Dominates a separating profile of oﬀers if an only if
δ ≥ δ00µo ≡
1 +R
1 +R+ µo1−µo
RpH−pL eRµo
1−µo ReR
.
Moreover, the threshold δ0µo ( δ
00
µo
) is increasing (decreasing) in µo.
These two thresholds move in opposite ways as the probability that Player
2 attaches to Player 1 being strong increases. When Player 2 becomes more
pessimistic, the battle becomes less attractive compared to the option of pooling,
because an all-out conflict against a strong opponent becomes more likely. On
the other hand, the battle becomes more attractive compared to a separating
profile of oﬀers because Player 2 can use it to screen his opponent. It allows
him to avoid an all-out conflict in case Player 1 wins. Note that this latter
eﬀect occurs in sharp contrast with Filson and Werner (2002), where the battle
was just a by-product of rejected oﬀers and where an increase in the prior
probability that Player 2 attaches to the strong type always made immediate
agreement more likely.
But the most important result is that the limited conflict displays a double-
edged eﬀect. On the one hand, the battle has a potential eﬃciency enhancing
eﬀect. When the loss ratio is moderately low, i.e. R ∈ [ eRµo
pL
pH
,
eR
µo
] and players
are suﬃciently patient, Player 2 triggers the battle. In that case, the all out
conflict only occurs with probability µo(1−pH) because if Player 1 wins, Player
2 becomes less optimistic about facing a weak opponent and that prompts him
to make a high oﬀer. Recall that in that area of the parameter space, Player
2 used a separating profile of oﬀers when the battle was not available and then
the all-out conflict occurred whenever Player 1 was of the strong type, i.e. with
probability µo. Hence, the use of battling as a screening device has a potentially
positive eﬀect on eﬃciency.
However, the opposite is also true. Recall from Proposition 3 that a suﬃcient
condition for immediate agreement was R > eRµo . This is no longer the case. If
Player 2 is suﬃciently patient, i.e δ ≥ δ0µo , he will use the battle to sort out
types. He precipitates the limited conflict as a way to gain new information on
his opponent and extract from him more surplus in case he manages to defeat
him. This has a negative impact on eﬃciency. The possibility of using conflict as
a screening device introduces delay when agreement was previously immediate.
Contrary to the assertion by Schelling (1960), limited conflict does not need to
increase the risk of an all-out one: the final eﬀect depends on the outcome of
such confrontation and on the incentives of parties to use it a bargaining tool.
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6.2.2 Conflict as a credible signal
Let us now add to the model in which the informed party makes all the oﬀers
the option of fighting a battle in the first period. Its outcome conveys "hard"
information on the type of Player 1 and will make Player 2 revise his beliefs.
In that case, the informed party will use the limited conflict as a way to signal
his strength. Again, the analysis of this signaling model is a modified version of
the one in Sanchez-Pages (2009).
The informed party has now two available actions at t = 1: He can make an
oﬀer x1 or trigger the battle, in which case the game proceeds to t = 2. In that
period, Player 1 makes the second and final oﬀer x2. Rejection of the second
oﬀer triggers the all-out conflict.
We now explore the conditions under which the profile in which both types
trigger the battle at t = 1 constitute a PBE of this game. It is straightforward
to show that again it cannot be the case that one type settles first and the
second type settles at the second period. Both types will either make an oﬀer
or trigger the battle. In the latter case, after observing its outcome, beliefs are
identical to the ones in (8). This defines two possible pooling oﬀers as a function
of the result of the skirmish
exV2 = 1− θ(1− µ+pH − (1− µ+)pL),
exD2 = 1− θ(1− µ−pH − (1− µ−)pL),
where clearly exV2 < exD2 : After a victory, Player 1 needs to oﬀer less to a now
more pessimistic Player 2 in order to obtain his acceptance. Against this, the
H type has the option of making a non serious oﬀer in the second period and
trigger the all-out conflict. It is clear that if the pooling oﬀer leaves him worse
oﬀ compared to that option in case of victory, i.e. if
R ≤ bR1− µ+
1− µo
,
conflict will ensue under both outcomes. By the same token, if under defeat,
the strong type of Player 1 still prefers to make the oﬀer exD2 , that is
R ≥ bR1− µ−
1− µo
,
pooling under both outcomes will prevail. In the intermediate case, pooling
occurs only under V.
Finally, consider the same set of beliefs (7) that we employed in the case
without the battle. Then it is straightforward to see that if parameters are
such that separation occurs under both outcomes, no type has any incentive
to trigger the battle. The information conveyed by the battle is not enough
to alter Player 2’s belief significantly. Then, depending on its type, Player 1
is better oﬀ by settling immediately or triggering the all-out conflict with two
non-serious oﬀers. Things are diﬀerent when pooling ensues under one or both
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outcomes. In that case, Player 1 can gain extra concessions by fighting. Again,
the discount factor plays a crucial role in the characterization of this case.
Proposition 6 In the game in which the informed party makes all oﬀers, the
battle is available and the uninformed agent holds beliefs (7), there exists a PBE
of the game in which both types fight the battle
(i) For relatively low values of the loss ratio, i.e. R ∈ [ bR 1−µ+1−µ0 , bR 1−µ−1−µ0 ], when
δ ≥ δ0 ≡ 1 +R
1 +R+ pLµ+
eR
1−µ0
.
(ii) For higher values of the loss ratio, i.e. R ≥ bR 1−µ−1−µ0 , when
δ ≥ δ00 ≡ 1 +R
1 +R+ (pLµ+ + (1− pL)µ−) eR1−µ0
.
Moreover, both δ0 and δ00 are decreasing in µ0.
Contrary to the screening case, an increase in the probability that Player
2 attaches to Player 1 being strong has an unambiguous eﬀect: It makes the
battle more likely. This is because when µ0 increases the pooling oﬀer increases
as well. Player 2 is less optimistic and accepts lower oﬀers. That makes the
strong type of Player 1 to resort to the battle and not to the all-out conflict.
Again, the battle can open the door to agreement in situations in which
it was not possible without it. When the battle is not too costly, the profile
in which both players trigger the battle dominates separation through oﬀers.
The all-out conflict occurs only if the strong type loses the battle and therefore
ineﬃciencies are reduced. But, again, it may be the case that the informed party
triggers the battle as a way to obtain a concession when immediate agreement
was feasible when it was not available.
This result helps us to shed light on the Uneven contenders paradox that we
outlined above. We argued that the fact that weak agents fight much stronger
ones is at odds with the observation that optimism should be of little importance
when the balance of observable strengths is very uneven. We conclude that this
phenomenon takes places because weak parties use conflict as a way to alter
the expectations of their opponents and to obtain more concessions from then.
That can occur even if optimism is not present. That is the reason why these
conflicts are rarely final: Guerilla warfare against a superpower or political
demonstrations against a repressive regime do not aim to defeat the opponents
in an absolute sense. They are just a form of tacit bargaining that weak parties
use to obtain better terms via a change in their opponents’ beliefs. Limited
conflicts provides them with a way to signal privately known and unverifiable
information about their strength.
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6.3 Discussion and extensions
Let us now revisit the idea of optimism as a cause of conflict. There exists the
view that at the end of many conflicts, specially military ones, expectations are
not longer divergent and that is what necessarily leads to peace. The results
above show that this observation is incomplete because it only looks at the
starting and ending points of a conflict and not at how it is conducted. It
is true that optimism is a necessary condition for conflict and that, therefore,
confrontations can terminate only if parties’ demands are compatible. But we
have seen that the latter does not imply that a convergence in expectations
ensures a settlement. This can be uncovered only if we abandon the idea that
conflict is just a by-product of disagreement and assume that it is a tool that
parties will choose to use as long as it is profitable.
One potential problem of the models discussed in this Section is that they
employed a very restrictive protocol. Although they can oﬀer important in-
sights on the dynamics of conflict and negotiation, they are underscored by the
limitations of their bargaining settings. Some other contributions have relaxed
these assumptions. However, as we will see, a slightly more general analysis
soon becomes very complex.
Powell (2004) extends Filson and Werner (2002) to an environment with an
infinite horizon. The author departs from the modelling of incomplete infor-
mation that we have considered so far. He adapts the bargaining model with
inside options by Muthoo (1999) in which bargaining can collapse each period
and the probability of breakdown is private information to one of the parties.
Hence, the uninformed party updates his beliefs with rejections and with the
fact that the uninformed party did not collapse. The diﬀerence with the ini-
tial model of screening we considered in Section 5.1 is that the passage of time
does convey information. This comes at the cost of reducing the importance of
limited fighting. Because a collapse did not happen, the uninformed party can
only become more pessimistic after fighting. The actual outcome of the skirmish
does not transmit any information. This shifts the emphasis of bargaining from
the battlefield to the negotiation table. Because of that, equilibria display very
similar properties to the ones on standard bilateral trade.
In a similar spirit to Smith and Stam (2003), Sanchez-Pages (2004) consid-
ers multiple battles but limits information transmission by assuming that the
uninformed party is unsophisticated and does not make inference from oﬀers he
receives from the informed one. In this case, the proponent’s strategy becomes
an optimal stopping problem. His equilibrium strategy consists of two sequences
of integers such that if the number of victories above the highest of the two,
the informed player makes an acceptable oﬀer, if it steps below the lowest one,
triggers the all-out conflict, and keeps battling otherwise. The author shows
that in this context, the stronger the informed player the more likely he is to
use limited confrontations because he owns a better "persuasion device".
Finally, Ponsati (2006) studies the role of commitment. The author explores
a Markov game in which bargaining states can give place to states in which one
of the parties commits fully to a particular demand and transitions between
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states are stochastic. This introduces frictions in the bargaining process but at
the same time generates diﬀerent types of equilibrium paths, including one with
the appealing property of involving long confrontations and in which demands
rejected initially are finally accepted.
7 Empirical evidence
Given that the literature on bargaining and conflict is relatively recent, only a
few works have tried to examine data on real conflicts in the light of the models
described above. As we have seen, these models tend to be complex and their
estimation is diﬃcult. There is for instance a fundamental problem with beliefs.
They play a central role in the presence of incomplete information but they are
unobservable, and it is not clear at all how could they be proxied. As argued
by Morrow (1989), a possible way out of this problem is to develop models that
allow us to derive testable empirical implications. Because such models already
incorporate beliefs in them, the problem of misspecification can be ameliorated.
There exist two main avenues for empirical research in this context: On
the one hand, the information provided by limited confrontations should aﬀect
the termination of conflicts and generate certain patterns of duration. On the
other hand, there is the vital issue of conflict initiation; some disputes become
full-fledged conflicts whereas others remain in the state of peaceful negotiations.
The empirical study of the duration and termination of conflicts can be
carried out with the tools of duration analysis. This technique looks at the
hazard rate of conflicts. The hazard rate is the probability of termination of
an event (a war, a marriage, a strike) conditional on it having lasted a certain
amount of time. When the hazard rate increases (decreases) in time, then the
event is said to exhibit positive (negative) duration dependence.
The initial hypothesis is that if conflict is part of the bargaining process
and it can be used as a negotiation instrument then this should have an impact
on the duration patterns of real conflicts. For instance, the screening model of
bargaining gives an indication of how these patterns should be. Since weaker
types tend to settle first and oﬀers increase with time, the a conflict should
be more likely to end the more it lasts. This led Filson and Werner (2002) to
conjecture that wars should display substantive positive duration dependence.
There may be some other reasons for this. As pointed out by Sanchez-Pages
(2009), one property of Bayesian updating is that the change in beliefs induced
by limited conflicts should be decreasing in the number of skirmishes fought.
Then, the expected concession obtained from fighting must be decreasing in
time. When players are impatient, that implies that the use of conflict as a
bargaining instrument must be a self-limiting phenomenon.
Filson and Werner (2002) in fact argued that the hazard rate of wars may be
U-shaped. That could explain why previous studies on wars that only focused
on monotonic hazard rates found no duration dependence (Bennett and Stam,
1996 and Vuchinich and Teachman, 1993)10 . Sanchez-Pages (2009) proposes an-
10This contrasts with the negative duration dependence found in contract negotiations (Ken-
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other explanation for the observed lack of duration dependence: these models
did not distinguish between termination modes. In some of these conflicts in-
complete information may have played no role. For instance, some colonial wars
were treated by European powers as internal rebellions that only deserved to be
crushed and therefore compromising was out of the question. The termination
mode can gives us clues on this: If a conflict ended in a negotiated settlement
then it was more likely to have a significant bargaining component. Of course,
this is just a proxy, because a total collapse is a possibility in most conflicts.
Hence, bargaining could also have been an important issue in some confronta-
tions that ended in an absolute way. Still, Sanchez-Pages (2009) shows that
colonial and imperial wars that ended in the complete annihilation of one of the
parties displayed a flat hazard rate, whereas those that ended in a negotiated
settlement display positive duration dependence.
However, this type of duration analysis assumes that there exists an un-
derlying battling process that makes the passage of time to reveal information.
But that does not need to be the case. Some confrontations may contain pro-
longed periods of inactivity whereas in others hostilities may be constant and
intense. There exist two solutions to this problem. One is to consider specific
case studies and analyze how participants’ estimates changed over the course of
the conflict. This is the route taken by Goemans (2000), who in an impressive
study of the First World War, proves that the Germans designed the attack at
Verdun to influence France’s estimate of its own relative strength.
The second possibility is to disaggregate the data and look at the battle-
field level. This approach is potentially very powerful but it is plagued with
problems on the availability and accuracy of data. Ramsay (2008) uses data on
battle days for a restricted set of interstate wars, to estimate the eﬀect of the in-
formation transmitted through limited confrontations on the probability of war
termination. The author finds that this eﬀect is positive during the first 40 days
of the conflict but vanishes after that, a finding that seems to run against the
informative role of confrontations. On the other hand, Slantchev (2004) found
that the events in the battlefield, that he proxied with the ratio of casualties
between the contenders, overcome quickly the eﬀect of observable capabilities
on duration. He also obtains that terms of settlement worsen for war initiators
as conflicts proceed, a result that is in line with the screening hypothesis.
If longer conflicts and more intense fighting induce a stronger convergence
of beliefs, the resulting settlements should be more stable and the probability
of further conflicts should be lower. This leads to some testable implications
on the likelihood of new conflicts. Schnell and Gramm (1982) show that lagged
strike experience reduces the propensity of unions to strike again. On the other
hand, Box-Steﬀensmeier et al. (2003) obtained that peace is more fragile after a
war that ended in a stalemate than after a war that ended in a decisive victory,
and that this eﬀect vanishes with time. That may explain why Sanchez-Pages
(2009) obtains that the number of previous disputes between two contenders
does not have an impact on the hazard rate of imperial and colonial wars.
nan and Wilson, 1989).
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The second issue that the empirical research on bargaining and conflict faces
is the problem of selection bias. Duration analysis cannot tell us anything about
why certain disputes turn into conflicts whereas others do not. As argued by
Morrow (1989), the set of conflicts observed cannot be treated just as a random
sample. This selection bias is well known in the literature on legal disputes
because only a small fraction of cases end up in trial (Wittman, 1988). As we
observed above, stronger types are more likely to initiate disputes because they
are the ones that have most to gain from that. This, of course, compounds
with the problem of misspecification stemming from the unobservability of be-
liefs. Hence, the observed conflicts are a subset of cases with specific balances
of strengths and distributions of beliefs. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1997) de-
veloped a model that looked into dispute initiation and estimated a U-shaped
eﬀect of observed capabilities on the probability of conflict between two states.
They obtain that a peaceful settlement is more likely when capabilities are sim-
ilar. This may explain the findings by Slantchev (2004), who obtains that wars
between more similar adversaries (in terms of observable capabilities) tend to
last longer. If parties know this, then they should be more reluctant to enter
into a conflict and more willing to settle their diﬀerences peacefully.
8 Conclusions and further research
The results and models described in this chapter oﬀer a comprehensive explana-
tion for the pervasiveness of confrontations in negotiations that puzzled Hicks so
much. Once we acknowledge that conflict itself is part of the bargaining process
and that it can become a screening or a signaling device, we need to restate his
assertion: A mutually beneficial agreement always exists, but if at least one of
the parties beliefs that he can improve his position in the bargaining table by
fighting then peace cannot be attained. A settlement will only take place when
all the parties involved find that the returns from standard diplomacy outweigh
the returns of using conflict as a bargaining tool.
Limited conflicts play a role that other mechanisms could also potentially
fulfill. The necessary conditions are that its outcome must be related in some
way to the outcome of a potential final confrontation and that it must be public.
It does not even need to be costly. As a matter of fact, it does not even need
to be fought against the other bargaining party. For instance, the defeat of a
colonial power against a colony will convey information to other dependencies
also engaged in a self-determination fight. Or the conduct of a strike in one
particular plant may transmit information on the profitability of the firm to
workers in other plants, as in Gu and Kuhn (1998). This information could
also be transmitted unilaterally, by, for instance, launching long range missiles
into the sea, as North Korea has being doing in recent years. In that sense,
the use of limited conflicts is related to the concept of "verifiable disclosure", in
which sellers provide information to buyers that external institutions or buyers
themselves can check in order to induce them to buy their products11 . The main
11For a survey on this literature see Milgrom (2008).
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diﬀerence between these two types of information is that conflict is typically
noisy (as reflected by the parameter γ in the formulation (1)). It is a gamble
that parties will sometimes find profitable to take.
In the analysis above, we have abstracted from the physical meaning of
limited conflicts. They were mostly instrumental. This comes at the price of
ignoring the non-informational gains and losses that limited confrontations can
generate. Smith and Stam (2003) and Slantchev (2003) assume that parties have
a finite quantity of forts because they implicitly assume that parties can sustain
only a limited number of losses before collapsing. One possible avenue for further
research could make explicit assumptions on the meaning of the battles. That
includes considering the possibility that the probability of victory an additional
battle changes with the previous events in the battlefield. However, without a
specific application in mind it is diﬃcult to see how this could be implemented.
Sometimes an initial setback precipitates the collapse of the loser but others it
increases his conflict eﬀort, like the case of the Allies in World War II. This may
explain the conflicting results obtained in the duration analysis of wars.
New bargaining models should allow us a direct computation of the hazard
rate. An open question is whether the type of uncertainty that parties face may
have an eﬀect on the duration dependence to be found. If uncertainty is over
costs (as in Powell, 2004) or over reservation stands (as in Heifetz and Segev,
2005) it is the passage of time and not battles what provides information, so
there is an extra incentive to wait as a way to learn. In short, another further
avenue of research is the development of bargaining models with directly testable
implications on duration patterns.
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